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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
DRUMMOND FINANCIAL SERVICES, 
LLC; et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
TMX FINANCE HOLDINGS, INC.; et al., 
Defendants. 
CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 
2014CV253677 
Business Case Div. 4 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR PROTECTIVE ORDERS 
AND TO QUASH PROPOSED DEPOSITIONS AND 
TO AMEND THE CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER 
The above styled action is before the Court on: Plaintiffs' letter brief requesting a 
protective order quashing the proposed deposition of Rod Aycox': Plaintiffs' letter brief 
requesting a protective order quashing the proposed deposition of Jesse Anderson"; Defendants' 
request for a protective order to quash the deposition of Tracy Young3; and Plaintiffs' request to 
amend the Case Management Order". Having considered the record, the Court finds and orders as 
follows:5 
Plaintiffs' letter regarding Rod Aycox, dated Jan. 4, 2019. 
Plaintiffs' letter regarding Jesse Anderson, dated Jan. 4, 2019. 
Defendants' letter regarding Tracy Young. dated Jan.10.2019. 
Plaintiffs' letter regarding amending the Case Management Order. dated Feb. 15, 2019. 
For ease of reference the Drummond Financial Services, LLC related entities (including those related to 
"Loanlvlax" companies) are referred to collectively herein as "Plaintiffs" or "Loanlvlax" and the TMX Financial 
Holdings, Inc. related entities (including those related ro "TitleMax" companies) are referred to collectively herein 
as "Defendants" or "TitleMax". 
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I. Applicable standards 
With respect to the general scope of discovery, O.C.G.A. §9-l 1-26(b)(l) provides: 
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not 
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in 
the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of 
the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any orher 
party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, 
condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible 
things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge 
of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that 
the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the 
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence ... 
(Emphasis added). 
"[I]n the discovery context, courts should and ordinarily do interpret 'relevant' very 
broadly to mean any matter that is relevant to anything that is or may become an issue in 
litigation." Bowden v. The Med. Ctr.. Tnc., 297 Ga. 285, 291, 773 S.E.2d 692, 696 (2015) 
(quoting Oppenheimer Fund. Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)) (internal punctuation 
omitted). See DeLoitte Haskins & Sells v. Green. 187 Ga. App. 376, 376, 370 S.E.2d 194, 195 
(1988) ("The courts of this Stale have Jong recognized the overriding policy of liberally 
construing the application of the discovery law. To hold otherwise would be to give every 
litigant an effective veto of his adversaries' attempts at discovery") (citation and internal 
punctuation omitted). 
However, the Court must "balance[] the right of a party to obtain discovery and the right 
of individuals to be protected from unduly burdensome or oppressive inquiries." In re Callaway, 
212 Ga. App. 500, 501, 442 S.E.2d 309, 310 (1994). In this regard O.C.G.A. §9-ll-26(c) 
generally governs the entry of protective orders and authorizes courts to "make any order which 
justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or 
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undue burden or expense." O.C.G.A. §9-11-26(c). "The issuance of a protective order is a 
recognition of the fact that in some circumstances the interest in gathering information must 
yield to the interest in protecting a party." Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia v. Ambati, 
299 Ga. App. 804,811,685 S.E.2d 719, 726 (2009) (citation omitted). 
Nevertheless, protective orders should not be used as a means to binder legitimate 
discovery and the burden is on the movant to show "good cause" for its entry. O.C.G.A. §9-11 - 
26(c). As summarized by the Court of Appeals of Georgia in Caldwell v. Church, 341 Ga. App. 
852, 802 S.E.2d 835 (2017): 
"O.C.G.A. § 9-1 l-26(c) does establish a general statutory basis for the 
entry of protective orders limiting or curtailing discovery under 
appropriate circumstances, provided such limitations do not have the 
effect of frustrating and preventing legitimate discovery." Christopher v. 
State of Ga., 185 Ga. App. 532, 533, 364 S.E.2d 905 (1988) (citation and 
punctuation omitted). Such protective orders, which are within the 
discretion of the trial judge, "are intended to be protective-not 
prohibitive-and, until such time as the court is satisfied by substantial 
evidence that bad faith or harassment motivates the discoveror's [sic] 
action, the court should not intervene to limit or prohibit the scope of 
pretrial discovery." Bullard v. Ewing, 158 Ga. App. 287, 291, 279 S.E.2d 
737 (1981) 
CaldweJI, 341 Ga. App. at 861 (no en-or in denying protective orders where movants failed to 
show that bad faith or harassment motivated the party seeking the depositions or what specific 
prejudice might result from the depositions) (emphasis added). See Galbreath v. Braley, 318 Ga. 
App. l 11, 113, 733 S.E.2d 412, 414 (2012) ("[P]rotective orders should not be awarded 'when 
the effect is to frustrate and prevent legitimate discovery'") (citing Intl. Svc. Ins. Co. v. Bowen, 
130 Ga. App. 140, 144, 202 S.E.2d 540 (1973)); Young v. Jones, 149 Ga. App. 819, 824, 256 
S.E.2d 58, 62 (l 979) ("Good cause for the issuance of a protective order designed to frustrate 
discovery must be clearly demonstrated")." 
6 As noted previously by this Court, it does not appear that the "apex doctrine" has ever been adopted by 
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11. Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order Regarding Rod Aycox 
Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter a protective order quashing the proposed deposition of 
Rod Aycox, the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") and a managing member of certain Plaintiffs 
and of an "affiliated company" called Select Management Resources, Inc. ("SMR"). Mr. Aycox 
avers he: does not have any "first-hand personal knowledge of relevant facts concerning the 
subject matter of [this Litigation]"; has never directed or been involved with taking pictures of 
TitleMax's "goal boards"; has not seen any pictures of TitleMax's "goal boards" or used 
information from them to make decisions on behalf of LoanStar; and any knowledge of facts 
related to this action were relayed to him in the course of privileged communications by 
Plaintiffs' counsel. 7 Plaintiffs contend that insofar as Mr. Aycox has no personal knowledge of 
facts relevant to this case, the deposition is intended only to harass and "distract him from 
running the business of Defendants' main competition.t''' 
Further, Plaintiffs note that in related litigation pending in Texas9 Defendants sought to 
compel Mr. Aycox 's deposition, alleging Mr. Aycox was "obsessed" with Defendants and their 
CEO (Tracy Young) and that Mr. Aycox's potential involvement in the geographic placement of 
stores was relevant to their claim that Plaintiffs used photographs of Defendants' "goal boards" 
to inform their decision-making regarding store placement. Plaintiffs opposed the motion in 
Texas, arguing Mr. Aycox's "natural interest in his competitor's business" does not have any 
Georgia stale courts. See Cuyler v. Kroger Co .• No. I: 14-CV-1287-WBH-AJB. 2014 WL 12547267, at *6 (N.D. Ga. 
Oct. 3, 2014), report and recommendation approved. No. l:14-CY-1287-RWS, 2015 WL 12621041 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 
8, 2015) ("[T]he apex doctrine requires that [the deposing party] show that each executive has 'unique or superior 
knowledge of discoverable information' that cannot be obtained by other means") (citing Chick-Fil-A, Inc. v. CFT 
Dev .. LLC. No. 5:07-cv-501-Oc-l0GRJ, 2009 WL 928226 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 3. 2009)). Thus. in considering the 
parties' respective motions and requests the Court shall apply Georgia law governing the general scope of discovery 
and the entry of protective orders as sel forth above. 
7 Rod Aycox Aff., 13. 
8 Plaintiffs' letter regarding Rod Aycox. dated Jan. 4, 2019. p. 2. 
9 Originally styled Wellshire Fin. Servs .. LLC et al. v. TMX Finance Holdings, Inc. el al.. District Court of 
Harris County, Texas. Case No.2013-33584, later removed to federal court and styled Wellshire Fin. Servs., LLC et 
al. v. TMX Finance Holdings. Inc. et al., U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Case No. 4: I 7-cv- 
02786 ("Texas Litigation"). 
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relevance and his involvement in the placement of stores is immaterial given undisputed 
evidence that he has never seen any goal board photographs nor received information from any 
such photographs. The Texas Court ultimately denied Defendants' motion to compel Mr. 
Aycox's deposition, and Plaintiff urge, similarly, this Court should quash his proposed 
deposition in this action. 
However, Defendants allege Mr. Aycox is not a peripheral "part owner" but rather is "the 
founder, CEO, and strategic director of numerous parentless companies whose only common tie 
is [Mr.] Aycox.t''" Defendants contend Mr. Aycox is uniquely positioned to testify about: 
Plaintiffs' organizational structure; its marketing strategy and decision to use the term "loan" 
instead of "pawn" in Georgia advertisements; and the transfer of assets or licenses among his 
companies to avoid liability in this action under the Georgia Pawnshop Act. Additionally, 
Defendants point to evidence indicating two regional Vice Presidents somehow obtained 
TitleMax contracts that were then forwarded to Mr. Aycox. Insofar as the deposed witnesses had 
no memory of why this occurred, Defendants assert Mr. Aycox is the only remaining witness 
who may provide answers. Further, Defendants contend Mr. Aycox's testimony regarding his 
companies' "culture of covert intelligence gathering" against Defendants is relevant and 
discoverable and that Mr. Aycox is well positioned to testify about how Plaintiffs could use 
"intelligence" on competitors generally given his involvement in developing Plaintiffs' fees and 
interest rates. 
The Court finds Mr. Aycox is likely to have discoverable information relevant to the 
claims and defenses in this action such that he may be deposed. Notably, the parties in this 
litigation are fierce competitors in the automobile title lending business, with each side alleging 
the other has engaged in widespread, coordinated, illegal schemes targeting them in each of the 
10 Defendants' response letter regarding Rod Aycox, dated Feb. I, 2019, p. 2. 
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states in which they operate. However, as acknowledged by Plaintiffs, they have no parent 
company but rather are 26 companies "affiliated by common ownership and control" and Mr. 
Aycox is a key figure in that common ownership and control." 
He holds "management roles" in a number of the entities12 and appears to have been 
involved in various operational aspects of the companies, including marketing, sales and real 
estate strategies and decisions relevant to the parties' allegations (e.g., use of the word "loan" 
instead of "pawn" in advertising. decisions to transfer assets/ownership/licenses from one 
Plaintiff entity to another, erc.)!'. Further it appears that in 2014, Mr. Aycox personally received 
TitleMax contracts in emails that were forwarded to him without explanation by regional Vice 
Presidents within minutes of those executives receiving them from lower level managers. These 
contracts were obtained and/or forwarded by individuals who, when deposed, did not know or 
could not "recall" why they were obtained and forwarded or if/how they were used.14 
Particularly in light of the allegations made in this litigation, Defendants are entitled to question 
Mr. Aycox as to what knowledge he has, if any, regarding how/why those contracts were 
obtained and forwarded and if/how they were used. 
Given all of the above, Plaintiffs' request for a protective order quashing Mr. Aycox's 
deposition is hereby DENIED. 
III. Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order Regarding Jesse Anderson 
Plaintiffs also ask the Court to enter a protective order quashing the proposed deposition 
of Jesse Anderson, a Vice President of Operations of Plaintiffs in Texas. According to Plaintiffs, 
II Second Amended Complaint, ~57. 
Rod Aycox Aff., ~ 2. 
13 Kenneth Wayco Depo., pp. 47-49, 103, 166-167; Catherine Leonard Depo., pp. 102-103, 154-157; Donald 
Brent Matthews Depo., pp. 54-59. 
14 Defendants' response letter regarding Rod Aycox, dated Feb. I, 2019, Exs. 12, 13: Andre Walker Depo., p. 
162-164; Donald Brent Matthews Depo., pp. 146-149. 157-160. 
12 
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Mr. Anderson came to learn of Defendants' employees' conduct in Texas to unlawfully search 
state department of motor vehicle (' DMV") records to identify and solicit Plaintiffs' customers. 
Mr. Anderson was also a supervisor of Zachary Fanner, a former manager for Plaintiffs in Texas 
who is alleged to have photographed Defendants' "goal boards", an allegation at the crux of 
Defendants' Second Counterclaim. 
Mr. Anderson was deposed twice in the related Texas Litigation. Specifically, he was 
deposed on June 27, 2013 and a limited deposition regarding only "goal board secret shopping" 
was taken on September 22, 2016. Plaintiffs contend that insofar as Mr. Anderson was only 
involved with Plaintiffs' Texas operations and those matters were covered in the prior 
depositions, "the sum of Mr. Anderson's knowledge regarding the facts at issue between 
Plaintiffs and Defendants has already been exhausted in his two prior Texas depositions" such 
that there is no new information to be garnered from a third deposition in this action.15 
However, as Defendants note, Mr. Anderson has never been deposed in this action. 
Indeed, his 2013 deposition was taken nearly a year and a half before Plaintiffs initiated this 
litigation and Defendants asserted their counterclaims. As such, there are claims, counterclaims, 
and defenses in this action that could not have been addressed during tbe 2013 deposition, 
including Plaintiffs' claims that Defendants' employees trespassed on Plaintiffs' property to 
improperly solicit customers and that Defendants' employees improperly offered to pay or have 
paid Plaintiffs' employees a referral fee.16 It appears these matters were not addressed during the 
2016 deposition (which Defendants assert lasted only approximately 70 minutes) as that 
deposition was limited by the Texas court to "goal board secret shopping" and Mr. Anderson was 
instructed by Plaintiffs' Texas counsel not to answer questions related to other issues. 
15 
16 
Plaintiffs' letter regarding Jesse Anderson, dated Jan. 4.2019. pp. 1-2. 
See, e.g .. Second Amended Complaint, t~ 107-112, 132-146. 
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As noted above, protective orders should not be granted when the effect is to frustrate or 
prevent legitimate discovery. See Caldwell, 341 Ga. App. al 861; Clu·istopher, 185 Ga. App. at 
533; Galbreath, 318 Ga. App. at 113; Intl. Svc. fns. Co .. 130 Ga. App. at 144. Given Mr. 
Anderson's various roles in Plaintiffs' business, including as Vice President of Operations in 
Texas from 2008 through at least 2016, 17 and in light of the claims, counterclaims and defenses 
at issue in this action which have not been addressed at Mr. Anderson's previous depositions in 
other litigation, Plaintiffs' request for a protective order quashing Mr. Anderson's deposition in 
this action is hereby DENI.ED. 
IV. Defendants' Motion for Protective Order Regarding Tracy Young 
Defendants ask the Court to issue a protective order prohibiting Plaintiffs from taking the 
deposition of Tracy Young, "the primary stakeholder in TMX Finance LLC, and the Chief 
Executive Officer of TitleMax of Georgia, Inc. and its affiliates."18 Defendants allege Plaintiffs 
have noticed Mr. Young's deposition for improper purposes=-in retaliation for Defendants· 
attempts to depose Plaintiffs' owner (Rod Aycox) and to harass Mr. Young personally. 
Defendants assert Mr. Young has no first-hand personal knowledge of the conduct at issue in this 
action and his limited knowledge regarding Plaintiffs' allegations of unlawful conduct is 
privileged because it was obtained through communications with counsel. Further, Defendants 
note that in the related Texas Litigation the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas 
vacated the trial court's order denying a motion to quash and to protect Mr. Young from being 
deposed. See In re TMX Fin. ofTexas. Inc., 472 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. App. 2015). 
In the Texas Litigation, Plaintiffs sought to depose Mr. Young arguing, inter alia, that he 
is the sole employee, member, and manager of TMX Finance, LLC (the parent company of 
17 
18 
Jesse Anderson Depo., p. 7. 
Defendants' letter regarding Tracy Young, dated Jan. I 0.2019, p. I. 
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various Defendant entities) such that only he can testify regarding TMX Finance's involvement 
in the allegedly illegal conduct forming the basis of Plaintiffs' claims in Texas. Id. at 868, 870. 
Plaintiffs also argued that in November of 2012 Plaintiffs' general counsel (John McCloskey) 
contacted Defendants' general counsel (Vin Thomas) accusing Defendants of engaging in 
unlawful DMV database searching to solicit Plaintiffs' customers and demanded Defendants 
cease and desist from such conduct. Id. at 869. Mr. Thomas then discussed the matter internally 
with the legal department as well as with Otto Bielss and Mr. Young and thereafter drafted a 
response letter denying that Defendants were engaged in such conduct and stating that 
Defendants "did not consider the [] allegations to be a proper business practice and ha] d] 
reminded all Texas managers of [Defendants'] position on this practice." liL_ at 869-70. Plaintiffs 
urged that, as the only employee of TMX Finance, Mr. Young was the only person who could 
have communicated its denial of Plaintiffs allegation and directed the response to Plaintiffs' 
counsel. Id. 
The trial court denied Defendants' motion to quash. However, applying the apex 
deposition doctrine (a doctrine widely recognized by Texas courts), 19 the Texas Court of Appeals 
held that "[rnjerely having some knowledge of the subject matter of a dispute is not enough to 
compel an apex deposition" and that Plaintiffs "ha]d] not shown that [Mr.] Young possesses 
unique or superior knowledge of discoverable information." Id. at 877. Importantly, however, in 
so holding the Texas Court of Appeals acknowledged and rejected Plaintiffs' argument that they 
had attempted to pursue less intrusive means of discovery. Id. at 877 n. 4. Specifically, given that 
in that same opinion the appellate court found Plaintiffs could permissibly depose Mr, Bielss 
(TMX Finance's Chief Operating Officer) the appellate court reasoned Plaintiffs had "a less 
intrusive means of obtaining the sought after discovery" allegedly held by Mr. Young. Id. 
19 But see note 5, supra. 
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Turning to this action, Plaintiffs oppose Defendants' motion for a protective order, citing 
the interactions and meetings between Mr. Thomas, Mr. Bielss, and Mr. Young and the response 
to Plaintiffs' counsel's November 2012 cease and desist letter. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert they 
have now deposed all other participants to those discussions other than Mr. Young and the 
deponents have testified that they cannot recall and/or would not discuss what, if any, actions 
Defendants took at a corporate level regarding the alleged DMV search misconduct following 
notice from Plaintiffs that such conduct was occurring. Because Defendants' corporate 
representative was similarly "unable to shed any light on the issue," Plaintiffs contend "Mr. 
Young's testimony is the only thing that can establish the san1e."20 Plaintiffs further assert such 
information is "crucial to confirm the willful nature of Defendants' actions", particularly given 
that evidence suggests that Defendants' employees were engaging in DMV searches months after 
the November 2012 correspondence between the parties' general counsel. 
The Court is compelled to note it previously denied the application for protective order of 
John W. Robinson, ITT, TitleMax's former CEO, regarding the Texas Litigation, finding that 
"[t]he extent to which TitleMax's upper management knew of [certain] alleged marketing 
misconduct, their position on these types of marketing strategies, and the actions they took on 
behalf of Titlelvlax as a result of their knowledge are relevant to the case."21 The same reasoning 
applies, here, with respect to Mr. Young given Defendants' November 2012 denial that improper 
DMV searching was taking place, Mr. Young's involvement in discussions leading up to that 
response, and Plaintiffs' allegation the improper DMV searching continued thereafter and 
occurred in other states. Plaintiffs are entitled to question Mr. Young regarding any non-privilege 
information he may have regarding these issues, if any. 
20 Plaintiffs' response letter regarding Tracy Young, dated Feb. I, 2019, p. I. 
John W. Robinson. Ill v. Wellshire Financial Services. LLC et al., Case No. 20 I 5CV259408, Order (dated 
Oct. 20, 2015). 
21 
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As Defendants note, communications between Mr. Young and counsel may be protected 
from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege. See O.C.G.A. §24-5-501 (a.)(2) ("There are 
certain admissions and communications excluded from evidence on grounds of public policy, 
including, ... [cjornmunications between attorney and client"); "St. Simons Waterfront LLC v. 
Htmter, Maclean. Exley & Dunn. P.C., 293 Ga. 419, 421-22, 746 S.E.2d 98, 103 (2013) ("The 
privilege generally attaches when legal advice is sought from an attorney, and operates to protect 
from compelled disclosure any conununications, made in confidence, relating to the matter on 
which the client seeks (legal] advice ... .It is well settled law in Georgia that the attorney- 
client privilege generally applies in the context of communications between in-house corporate 
counsel and the corporation's management and employees"). However, that does not entirely 
preclude inquiry into Defendants' corporate response and any corporate actions Defendants took 
after Plaintiffs placed them on notice of the alleged misconduct in November 2012. Given all of 
the above, Defendants' motion to quash the deposition of Mr. Young and for entry of a 
protective order is hereby DENIED. 
V. Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the Case Management Order 
Plaintiffs ask the Court to amend the Second Amended Case Management Order to 
extend certain deadlines for expert discovery. Having considered the extensive record and in 
light of the Court's rulings herein as well as the Court's rulings issued on Jan. 22, 2019 on 
various discovery disputes, the Court orders that the following amended deadlines shall govern 
the final adjudication of this action: 
(1) The depositions of Mr. Aycox, Mr. Anderson and Mr. Young shall take place no later 
than March 29, 2019. 
11 
(2) In the Jan. 22, 2019 Order on Pending Motions and Discovery Disputes, the Court 
granted in part Plaintiffs' motion to compel related to information regarding referral 
fee payments (Interrogatory No. 7) and granted Defendants' related motion to compel 
regarding the production of employee contracts relevant to Plaintiffs' tortious 
interference claim. See Order on Pending Motions and Discovery Disputes. pp. 14- l 9. 
The parties shall supplement their discovery responses in accordance with the 
foregoing rulings by March 29, 2019. 
(3) All affirmative expert reports or any supplement thereto shaJI be submitted no later 
than April 29, 2019. 
(4) All rebuttal expert reports or any supplement thereto shall be submitted no later than 
May 29, 2019. 
(5) The parties shall file any motions for summary judgment and any motions in limine 
no later than June 29, 2019. Responses to any such motions shall be filed no later 
than July 29, 2019. 
(6) The parties shall submit a consolidated pretrial order within 45 days of the receipt of 
the Court's ruling on any motions for summary judgment or motions in limine. The 
case will be set down for a pretrial conference and trial as soon as practicable after the 
entry of a pretrial order. No further extensions shall be granted. 
SO ORDERED this + day of March, 2019. 
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